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383 
Note 
 
Toward Definition, Not Discord: Why Congress 
Should Amend the Family and Medical Leave Act 
To Preclude Individual Liability for Supervisors 
Taylor C. Stippel* 
Imagine that you are a low-level supervisor who works for 
a public agency. An employee approaches you and requests that 
you grant him leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act1 
(FMLA) to care for his intermittent asthma attacks. You con-
sult a superior and are told to deny the request, and you follow 
your superior’s instructions. Months later, you are informed 
that you, your superior, and the public agency for which you 
work are being sued by the employee who was denied FMLA 
leave. You are further informed that you might be on the hook 
for paying the suing employee’s lost compensation and employ-
ee benefits for the time that he should have been on FMLA 
leave. 
Such is the difficult situation faced by many modern su-
pervisors. Beyond the traditional functions of hiring, firing, and 
promoting, supervisors are now charged with interpreting the 
complex statutory and regulatory scheme of the FMLA, which 
baffles even the shrewdest of lawyers.2 Courts in the mid-1990s 
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Kitrosser for her invaluable feedback throughout the drafting process. Thanks 
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years. I would like to express my appreciation for the board and staff of the 
Minnesota Law Review for their diligent work. Thank you to my mother, Lori 
Stippel, for believing that I can conquer the world, despite evidence to the 
contrary. Thank you to my father, Roger Stippel, for always reminding me 
that my best is good enough. Thanks to my sister, Morgan Stippel, for teach-
ing me to live courageously and unapologetically. And finally, thanks to Alec 
Sloan for his unwavering support and willingness to be a sounding board for 
my law-related musings. Copyright © 2016 by Taylor C. Stippel. 
 1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2012). 
 2. Several individuals and organizations have promulgated publications 
specifically tailored to answer supervisors’ questions regarding the FMLA’s 
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held that the FMLA exposes private sector supervisors to indi-
vidual liability.3 But because these early decisions relied almost 
exclusively on the similarity between the Fair Labor Standards 
Act4 (FLSA) and FMLA definitions of “employer,”5 their reason-
ing discouraged thorough, FMLA-specific policy analyses in fu-
ture cases. Today, a federal circuit split exists on the question 
of whether the FMLA allows for the imposition of individual 
liability on public sector supervisors.6 The Second, Third, Fifth, 
and Eighth Circuits have relied primarily on the similarity of 
the FMLA and FLSA definitions of “employer” to hold that in-
dividual liability may be imposed on public sector supervisors, 
reflecting analyses similar to those proffered by courts reaching 
 
complexities. See, e.g., Carl C. Bosland, Individual Supervisor Liability, FMLA 
BLOG (Feb. 13, 2012), http://federalfmla.typepad.com/fmla_blog/individual_ 
supervisor_liability; FMLA Training for Supervisors, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RE-
SOURCE MGMT., https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/ 
presentations/pages/fmlatrainingforsupervisors.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 
2016). 
 3. See, e.g., Knussman v. Maryland, 935 F. Supp. 659, 664 (D. Md. 1996); 
Freemon v. Foley, 911 F. Supp. 326, 332 (N.D. Ill. 1995); McKiernan v. Smith-
Edwards-Dunlap Co., Civ. A. No. 95-1175, 1995 WL 311393, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 
May 17, 1995). 
 4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219. The FLSA regulates minimum wage, overtime 
pay, and child labor. See id. §§ 206, 207, 212. The FLSA defines “employer” to 
include “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer 
in relation to an employee and includ[ing] a public agency.” Id. § 203(d). Per-
sons who willfully violate the FLSA may be subjected to fines and imprison-
ment. Id. § 216(a). Employers who violate the FLSA may be liable for lost pay 
and an equal amount of liquidated damages, as well as any other legal or equi-
table relief that a court deems appropriate to effectuate the goals of the FLSA, 
such as reinstatement, promotion, and employment. Id. § 216(b). 
 5. See Knussman, 935 F. Supp. at 664 (“Liability under the FMLA is 
essentially the same as liability under the FLSA.”); Freemon, 911 F. Supp. at 
330–32; McKiernan, 1995 WL 311393, at *3. 
 6. Compare Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 829 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that the FMLA does not impose individual liability on public offi-
cials), and Wascura v. Carver, 169 F.3d 683, 686–87 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding 
that a public official sued in his individual capacity is not an employer under 
the FMLA), with Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 
408, 417 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that the FMLA allows for the imposition of 
individual liability on public sector supervisors), and Modica v. Taylor, 465 
F.3d 174, 187 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding a public employee individually liable 
under a plain language reading of the FMLA), and Darby v. Bratch, 287 F.3d 
673, 681 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that a public official may be individually lia-
ble for violating the FMLA). Additionally, without distinguishing between the 
public and private sectors, the Second Circuit held that the FMLA allows for 
the imposition of individual liability on supervisors if the “economic reality” of 
the employment situation suggests that such liability is appropriate. See 
Graziadio v. Culinary Inst. of Am., 817 F.3d 415, 422 (2d Cir. 2016). 
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similar holdings in the mid-1990s with respect to private sector 
supervisors.7 The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, by contrast, 
have held against imposing individual liability on public sector 
supervisors on precedential and statutory interpretation 
grounds.8 
It is essential that the current circuit split be resolved 
quickly, as the existing FMLA liability regime is detrimental to 
both employers and their supervisors. Employers in both the 
private and public sectors have been forced to rely on indefinite 
jurisprudence9 in attempting to comply with the FMLA’s terms 
since the statute was enacted and are entitled to a level of pre-
dictability that allows them to avoid exposing both themselves 
and their supervisors to FMLA liability.10 For their part, super-
visors are faced with the prospect of being held personally re-
sponsible for satisfying staggering damage awards and paying 
their own trial fees,11 but are not afforded the guidance to know 
when such liability may attach. The current judicial disarray 
thus disadvantages both employers and their supervisors. 
This Note offers a solution to the current circuit split re-
garding individual liability for public sector supervisors. Part I 
will describe the FMLA, the courts’ rationale for finding in fa-
vor of individual liability for private sector supervisors, and the 
current circuit split as to individual liability for public sector 
supervisors. Part II will explore the problems with the courts’ 
analyses of individual liability for private sector supervisors 
under the FMLA in the 1990s and address how such reasoning 
has tied the hands of the circuit courts as they analyze the in-
 
 7. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 8. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 9. See infra Parts I.B.1, II.A.1. 
 10. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2012) (promising that the FMLA’s purposes 
will be accomplished “in a manner that accommodates the legitimate interests 
of employers”). 
 11. Although a supervisor may be indemnified by his employer for an ad-
verse judgment and trial costs should a court hold him individually liable for 
an FMLA violation, such indemnification is not a certainty. See Judith E. Har-
ris, Ethical Issues in Employment Law, AM. L. INST. CONTINUING LEGAL 
EDUC., http://files.ali-cle.org/thumbs/datastorage/skoobesruoc/source/CG060_ 
17HarrisEthicsinEmploCG060_thumb.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2016) (“[A]n 
employer generally is under no legal obligation to provide representation or 
indemnification of legal expenses for an employee who has been sued . . . .”); 
see also FMLA Alert: Supervisors May Be Personally Liable when Sued by Em-
ployees, NOLAN PERRONI HARRINGTON, LLP (Feb. 29, 2012), https:// 
nphlegal.wordpress.com/2012/02/29/fmla-alert-supervisors-may-be-personally 
-liable-when-sued-by-employees (“[M]any public employers DO NOT indemni-
fy supervisors for judgments.”). 
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dividual liability question in the public sector context. Part III 
will suggest a solution to the current division in the federal 
courts on the subject of individual liability. Specifically, this 
Note proposes that Congress resolve the current circuit split by 
amending the FMLA to preclude individual liability for super-
visors, both public and private, and instead impose respondeat 
superior liability for FMLA violations. 
I.  THE DISPOSAL OF THE INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY 
QUESTION AS TO PRIVATE SECTOR SUPERVISORS AND 
ITS RECENT REVIVAL IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR   
While the FMLA may seem like a straightforward entitle-
ment statute, the devil is in its details, many of which go unex-
plained or remain ambiguous in the FMLA and its implement-
ing regulations. The FMLA and its legislative history do not 
explicitly describe which supervisors are considered “employ-
ers” within the meaning of the FMLA or whether supervisors 
may be held individually liable for violations of the Act.12 Sec-
tion A describes the FMLA’s purposes, definitions, and reme-
dies. Section B examines the reasoning of 1990s court decisions 
holding in favor of and against individual liability for private 
sector supervisors, noting that the former view prevailed. Sec-
tion C discusses the arguments raised in favor of and against 
individual liability in the current circuit split regarding indi-
vidual liability for public sector supervisors. Finally, Section D 
summarizes where various courts stand on the individual lia-
bility question with respect to both the private and public sec-
tors. 
A. THE FMLA: PURPOSES, DEFINITIONS, AND REMEDIES 
The FMLA entitles eligible employees13 of covered employ-
ers14 to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave in any twelve-
 
 12. See Sandra F. Sperino, Under Construction: Questioning Whether 
Statutory Construction Principles Justify Individual Liability Under the Fami-
ly and Medical Leave Act, 71 MO. L. REV. 71, 97 (2006) (“[T]here is no legisla-
tive history to suggest the intent of Congress regarding individual liability 
under the FMLA . . . .”); Kegan A. Brown, Note, My Individual Acts Can Get 
Me Fired, but Can My Supervisor’s Individual Acts Get Me Money?: Examining 
Individual Liability for Public Sector Supervisors Under the Family and Medi-
cal Leave Act, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 1023, 1043 (2006) (“[T]here is no relevant 
legislative history specifically covering public official individual liability.”). 
 13. In general, an employee is eligible to take advantage of FMLA leave if 
he or she has (1) been employed for at least twelve months by the employer 
from whom he or she requests leave; and (2) worked for at least 1,250 hours 
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month period for one of the following reasons: (1) the birth or 
adoption of a child; (2) to care for a child, spouse, or parent with 
a serious health condition;15 (3) for the employee’s own serious 
health condition that renders him or her unable to perform his 
or her job; or (4) any qualifying exigency arising from the fact 
that an employee’s spouse, son, daughter, or parent is on cov-
ered active duty in the Armed Forces.16 Employers are prohibit-
ed from interfering with employees’ use of leave to which the 
FMLA entitles them, as well as from discriminating or retaliat-
ing against employees who have exercised their rights under 
the FMLA.17 Congress delineated several purposes served by 
the FMLA and prescribed definitions and remedies in order to 
effectuate its remedial goals.18 Additionally, Congress author-
ized the Secretary of Labor to promulgate regulations regard-
ing the FMLA.19 The remainder of Section A discusses the 
FMLA’s purposes, definition of “employer,” and remedies in or-
der to put the individual liability problem in context. 
1. The FMLA’s Purposes 
Congress enacted the FMLA in response to several find-
ings, including the following: (1) employment policies were forc-
ing working parents to choose between family and job security; 
(2) there was inadequate job security for working individuals 
with serious health conditions; and (3) the then-existing regula-
tory framework provided insufficient protection for working 
women, on whom the primary responsibility for childrearing 
disproportionately fell.20 Thus, Congress’s purpose in enacting 
the FMLA was two-fold: entitle eligible employees to unpaid 
 
for that employer during the previous twelve-month period. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 2611(2)(A). 
 14. For a discussion of the types of employers covered by the FMLA, see 
infra Part I.A.2. 
 15. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11) (“The term ‘serious health condition’ means 
an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves—
(A) inpatient care at a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility; or 
(B) continuing treatment by a health care provider.”). 
 16. Id. § 2612(a)(1). An eligible employee who is the spouse, son, daugh-
ter, parent, or next of kin of a covered service member is entitled to a total of 
twenty-six workweeks of leave during a twelve-month period to care for the 
service member. Id. § 2612(a)(3). 
 17. Id. § 2615. 
 18. See id. §§ 2601(b), 2611, 2617. 
 19. Id. § 2654. 
 20. Id. § 2601(a). 
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leave on a uniform basis and prevent discrimination on the ba-
sis of sex.21 
2. The FMLA’s Definition of “Employer” 
Congress defined “employer” in the text of the FMLA, and 
the Department of Labor promulgated clarifying regulations. 
An “employer” under the FMLA is “any person engaged in 
commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce 
who employs 50 or more employees for each working day dur-
ing each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or 
preceding calendar year.”22 The FMLA’s definition of “employer” 
includes “any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the in-
terest of an employer to any of the employees of such employ-
er.”23 The legislative history of the FMLA yields no substantive 
discussion of the term “employer” beyond giving the definition 
of that term as it appears in the FMLA itself.24 In its regula-
tions, the Department of Labor notes that the FMLA’s defini-
tion of “employer” is similar to the FLSA’s definition of “em-
ployer.”25 The Department of Labor’s regulations further note 
that “normally the legal entity which employs the employee is 
the employer under FMLA.”26 Because employees bringing suit 
under the FMLA often bring claims against both the employing 
entity itself and specific individuals charged with violating the 
FMLA, many court opinions provide a threshold analysis of 
 
 21. It is for this reason that the FMLA cannot easily be compartmental-
ized as either an entitlement or an antidiscrimination statute. See Catherine 
Brainerd, Note, Hide and Seek: The FMLA Game of Personal Liability for Pub-
lic Sector Supervisors, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1587, 1589 (2005) (noting that em-
ployees invoke an “Interference or Entitlement Theory” when they allege em-
ployer interference with leave to which they are entitled, while employees 
invoke a “Discrimination or Retaliation Theory” when they allege employer 
retaliation in response to employee assertion of FMLA rights). 
 22. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i). 
 23. Id. § 2611(4)(A)(ii)(I). 
 24. See S. REP. NO. 103-3, at 43 (1993). While the Senate noted that 
“[t]hose definitions specifically referenced to the Fair Labor Standards Act are 
to be interpreted similarly under this Act,” this blanket statement is relatively 
unhelpful as applied to the FMLA’s definition of “employer” because only one 
subpart of this definition (the subpart referring to “public agencies”) specifical-
ly references the FLSA. Id. 
 25. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(d) (2015) (“As under the FLSA, individuals 
such as corporate officers ‘acting in the interest of an employer’ are individual-
ly liable for any violations of the requirements of FMLA.”). 
 26. Id. § 825.104(c). 
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which defendants are “employers” within the meaning of the 
FMLA.27 
3. The FMLA’s Remedies 
The FMLA provides that an aggrieved employee may re-
cover damages in the amount of “any wages, salary, employ-
ment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost to such em-
ployee by reason of the violation.”28 If the employee has not suf-
fered a loss of wages, salary, employment benefits, or other 
compensation, he or she may recover any actual monetary loss-
es sustained as a result of the violation (e.g., the cost of provid-
ing care to a parent with a serious health condition).29 A court 
may also award an amount of liquidated damages equal to the 
sum of the employee’s lost compensation (or actual monetary 
losses), unless the employer can demonstrate that its violation 
was in good faith and that it had reasonable grounds for believ-
ing that it did not violate the FMLA.30 Finally, a court may 
award the employee appropriate equitable relief, including em-
ployment, reinstatement, or promotion.31 
B. INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY FOR PRIVATE SECTOR SUPERVISORS 
UNDER THE FMLA 
Shortly after the FMLA was enacted, two lines of thought 
emerged regarding individual liability for private sector super-
visors under the Act. While some courts analogized the FMLA 
to the FLSA and found in favor of individual liability,32 others 
compared the FMLA to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
196433 (Title VII) and refused to impose individual liability.34 
 
 27. See, e.g., Johnson v. A.P. Prods., Ltd., 934 F. Supp. 625, 628–29 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Reich v. Midwest Plastic Eng’g, Inc., No. 1:94-CV-525, 1995 
WL 478884, at *5–6 (W.D. Mich. June 6, 1995). 
 28. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(I). 
 29. Id. § 2617 (a)(1)(A)(i)(II). 
 30. Id. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(iii). 
 31. Id. § 2617(a)(1)(B). 
 32. See, e.g., Knussman v. Maryland, 935 F. Supp. 659, 664 (D. Md. 1996); 
Freemon v. Foley, 911 F. Supp. 326, 330–32 (N.D. Ill. 1995); McKiernan v. 
Smith-Edwards-Dunlap Co., Civ. A. No. 95-1175, 1995 WL 311393, at *3 (E.D. 
Pa. May 17, 1995). 
 33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012). Title VII makes it unlawful for employers to 
discriminate against any individual with regard to his or her compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of his or her race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id. § 2000e-2(a). An employer who inten-
tionally violates Title VII may be required to reinstate or hire the individual 
who brought suit and may also be liable for back pay, as well as compensatory 
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The former view prevailed, and the majority of courts now hold 
that individual liability may be imposed on private sector su-
pervisors.35 The remainder of Section B will examine the evolu-
tion of the majority and minority views in greater detail in or-
der to frame the current circuit split regarding individual lia-
bility in the public sector context. 
1. Analogizing the FMLA to the FLSA: The Rationale Behind 
Finding Individual Liability for Private Sector Supervisors 
Before introducing the court cases that found in favor of 
individual liability for private sector supervisors under the 
FMLA based on analogies to the FLSA, a short discussion of 
individual liability under the FLSA is warranted. Courts ana-
lyzing individual liability under the FLSA have applied a “con-
trol test” for determining which supervisors count as “employ-
ers” for FLSA purposes and, thus, are open to liability.36 Appli-
cation of the FLSA “control test” allows courts to determine 
which supervisors exercise sufficient control over employees to 
be deemed “employers,” and involves weighing the following 
factors: the authority to hire and fire employees, the authority 
to set the terms and conditions of employment, the authority to 
control and direct the conditions of employment, and the re-
sponsibility to pay wages.37 Courts have applied the FLSA con-
 
and punitive damages. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(1). An employer who can demonstrate 
that it would have taken the same employment action in the absence of an 
impermissible motivating factor will not be required to pay damages, rein-
state, or hire the employee, but may be subjected to an injunction and be re-
quired to pay attorney’s fees. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2). 
 34. See, e.g., Carter v. Rental Unif. Serv. of Culpeper, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 
753, 759 (W.D. Va. 1997); Frizzell v. Sw. Motor Freight, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 441, 
449 (E.D. Tenn. 1995). 
 35. See Brainerd, supra note 21, at 1607 (“In the private sector, the dis-
cussion over individual liability has been somewhat more muted, with a ma-
jority of the courts holding that individual liability for supervisors and similar-
ly situated employees is proper.”). 
 36. See 2 LES A. SCHNEIDER & J. LARRY STONE, WAGE AND HOUR LAW 
§ 21:13 (2015) (“[W]hether an individual is an employer is based on actions 
resulting from control and not on titles like ‘employer’ or ‘representative.’” 
(emphasis added)). 
 37. See id. No single factor is dispositive in determining which supervisors 
constitute employers, but “the authority to control and direct the conditions of 
employment is given the most weight of the four factors.” Id. For a detailed 
discussion of courts’ application of the FLSA “control test,” see Sandra F. 
Sperino, Chaos Theory: The Unintended Consequences of Expanding Individu-
al Liability Under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. 
POL’Y J. 175, 196–99 (2005). 
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trol test to hold liable upper-level individuals such as owners, 
major shareholders, chief executive officers, and company pres-
idents.38 
Many courts addressing the FMLA individual liability 
question in the private sector context turned to FLSA prece-
dent for guidance in determining which supervisors constitute 
employers for FMLA purposes. These courts analyzed the 
FMLA’s definition of “employer” by comparing it to the nearly 
identical definition of “employer” under the FLSA and, ulti-
mately, applied FLSA case law to find in favor of individual li-
ability for private sector supervisors under the FMLA.39 
In Freemon v. Foley, deemed the “seminal case finding in-
dividual liability under the FMLA,”40 the Northern District of 
Illinois held that the plaintiff-employee’s immediate supervisor 
qualified as an employer under the FMLA and could be sued in 
her individual capacity.41 The court reasoned that the definition 
of “employer” under the FMLA mirrored the definition of that 
term under the FLSA,42 but not under antidiscrimination stat-
utes like Title VII,43 the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act44 (ADEA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act45 (ADA).46 
 
 38. See, e.g., Dole v. Elliott Travel & Tours, Inc., 942 F.2d 962, 965–66 
(6th Cir. 1991); Chambers Constr. Co. v. Mitchell, 233 F.2d 717, 724 (8th Cir. 
1956); Usery v. Godwin Hardware, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 1243, 1246–47 (W.D. 
Mich. 1976). 
 39. See, e.g., Knussman v. Maryland, 935 F. Supp. 659, 664 (D. Md. 1996) 
(“Liability under the FMLA is essentially the same as liability under the 
FLSA.”); Freemon v. Foley, 911 F. Supp. 326, 330–32 (N.D. Ill. 1995); McKi-
ernan v. Smith-Edwards-Dunlap Co., Civ. A. No. 95-1175, 1995 WL 311393, at 
*3 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 1995). 
 40. Meara v. Bennett, 27 F. Supp. 2d 288, 291 (D. Mass. 1998). 
 41. See Freemon, 911 F. Supp. at 332. 
 42. See sources cited supra note 4. 
 43. See sources cited supra note 33. Title VII defines “employer” to include 
“a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more 
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in 
the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person.” 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012). 
 44. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012). The ADEA defines “employer” to include 
“a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more 
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in 
the current or preceding calendar year . . . [and] any agent of such person.” Id. 
§ 630. 
 45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213. The ADA defines “employer” to include “a 
person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more em-
ployees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the cur-
rent or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person.” Id. § 12111. 
 46. See Freemon, 911 F. Supp. at 330. 
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The court then followed its FLSA precedent and delineated a 
version of the FLSA “control test” that it would apply to indi-
vidual defendants in FMLA cases: “The FMLA extends to all 
those who controlled ‘in whole or in part’ [the employee’s] abil-
ity to take a leave of absence and return to her position.”47 Be-
cause the employee’s immediate supervisor had recommended 
that she be terminated due to a month-long absence, the court 
held the supervisor liable in her individual capacity under the 
FMLA.48 A number of other courts followed the Freemon court 
in turning to FLSA precedent and holding in favor of individual 
liability for private sector supervisors.49 
Two trends emerged from the Freemon line of cases finding 
in favor of individual liability for private sector supervisors un-
der the FMLA. First, courts developed several different “control 
tests” for determining whether individual liability attaches un-
der the FMLA.50 Across jurisdictions, these tests require differ-
ent levels of control in order to find supervisors individually 
liable for FMLA violations.51 Second, courts conducted brief and 
non-FMLA-specific policy analyses. Indeed, the Freemon opin-
ion included no FMLA-specific policy analysis and the court 
stated that it would “look to the FLSA . . . to enlighten [its] in-
terpretation of the term ‘employer’ under the FMLA”52 before 
relying on FLSA case law to hold individually liable three su-
pervisors.53 Like the Freemon court, most courts relied almost 
exclusively on analogizing the FMLA’s definition of “employer” 
to the FLSA’s definition of “employer.”54 Nevertheless, a majori-
 
 47. Id. at 332. 
 48. Id. at 331. 
 49. See, e.g., Beyer v. Elkay Mfg. Co., No. 97 C 50067, 1997 WL 587487, at 
*4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 1997); Holt v. Welch Allyn, Inc., No. 95-CV-1135, 1997 
WL 210420, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1997); Knussman v. Maryland, 935 F. 
Supp. 659, 664 (D. Md. 1996). 
 50. Sperino has noted that seven different FMLA “control tests” have 
emerged, each requiring a different level of control over the plaintiff-employee, 
the alleged FMLA violation, and the company’s dealings in order to impose 
individual liability. See Sperino, supra note 37, at 217. 
 51. See id. (“Some tests require the individual to have a high-level posi-
tion within the company, while others require only a supervisory position. Still 
other tests contemplate that almost any individual who works for a company 
can be individually liable if he or she plays a role in the alleged violation.”). 
 52. Freemon, 911 F. Supp. at 330. 
 53. Id. at 332. 
 54. See Sperino, supra note 12, at 71 (“[T]he courts have merely punted, 
failing to provide any thorough analysis, by . . . referring to similar language 
in the Fair Labor Standards Act (‘FLSA’), which has been interpreted as allow-
ing individual liability.”). 
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ty of courts have relied on comparing the FMLA to the FLSA in 
order to hold that individual liability may be imposed on pri-
vate sector supervisors under the FMLA.55 
2. Analogizing the FMLA to Title VII: The Rationale Behind 
the Refusal To Find Individual Liability for Private Sector 
Supervisors 
Although the majority of courts held that individual liabil-
ity could be imposed on private sector supervisors under the 
FMLA, a few courts refused to impose such liability.56 For ex-
ample, in Frizzell v. Southwest Motor Freight, Inc., the Eastern 
District of Tennessee stated that the FMLA’s definition of “em-
ployer” should be construed similarly to Title VII’s definition of 
“employer.”57 Because the vast majority of circuit courts had 
held that individual liability for supervisors could not be im-
posed under Title VII,58 the court held that such liability was 
not available under the FMLA, either.59 The Frizzell court 
pointed to principles from an earlier case holding against the 
imposition of individual liability under Title VII to support its 
parallel holding regarding the FMLA, including the following: 
(1) Congress intended to incorporate respondeat superior prin-
ciples under Title VII; (2) the remedies under Title VII are 
remedies that an employer, not an individual, would provide; 
and (3) individual liability under Title VII is inconsistent with 
the limitation of its reach to employers with fifteen or more 
employees.60 
As exemplified by the Frizzell court’s opinion, the courts 
holding against individual liability for private sector supervi-
sors under the FMLA did so for the following reasons: (1) they 
 
 55. See Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 827–28 (6th Cir. 2006) (sup-
porting its assertion that the similarity between the FLSA and FMLA’s defini-
tions of “employer” supports a holding in favor of individual FMLA liability 
with citations to over fifteen cases). 
 56. See, e.g., Carter v. Rental Unif. Serv. of Culpeper, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 
753, 759 (W.D. Va. 1997); Frizzell v. Sw. Motor Freight, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 441, 
449 (E.D. Tenn. 1995). 
 57. Frizzell, 906 F. Supp. at 449. 
 58. See JOHN F. OLSON ET AL., DIRECTOR & OFFICER LIABILITY: INDEMNI-
FICATION AND INSURANCE § 3.11 (2015–2016 ed. 2015) (“Virtually all of the 
Circuit Courts of Appeals have . . . followed the lead of the Ninth Circuit in 
holding that Title VII does not impose individual liability, even if an employ-
er’s agent has supervisory authority over the complaining employee.”). 
 59. See Frizzell, 906 F. Supp. at 449. 
 60. See id. (summarizing the court’s reasoning in Arnold v. Welch, No. 
1:92-CV-562, 1995 WL 785572 (E.D. Tenn. July 5, 1995)). 
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looked past the fact that the FMLA and FLSA define “employ-
er” similarly;61 and (2) they adopted a more functionalist ap-
proach, analyzing the policy implications of attaching individu-
al liability to supervisors under the FMLA.62 These courts rec-
ognized that federal employment statutes generally do not im-
pose individual liability and attempted to construe the FMLA 
in a manner that was consistent with this pattern.63 Neverthe-
less, the courts that resisted imposing individual FMLA liabil-
ity on private sector supervisors espoused what became the mi-
nority view, as subsequent courts rejected analyses analogizing 
the FMLA to Title VII.64 
C. DOWN, BUT NOT OUT: THE REVIVAL OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
LIABILITY QUESTION WITH REGARD TO PUBLIC SECTOR 
SUPERVISORS 
Although the majority of courts have held that individual 
FMLA liability may be imposed on private sector supervisors, 
there is a persisting circuit split as to whether such liability 
attaches to public sector supervisors. Arguments cited by the 
circuit courts finding in favor of individual liability for public 
sector supervisors have largely paralleled those raised in the 
1990s regarding the similarity between the FMLA and FLSA 
definitions of “employer.”65 Those circuit courts opposing the 
imposition of individual liability on public sector supervisors 
have, however, turned to alternative lines of argument to sup-
 
 61. See, e.g., Carter, 977 F. Supp. at 759–60 (refusing to accept plaintiff ’s 
citation of an FLSA case at face value, distinguishing its facts from those that 
were before the court, and opting to construe the FMLA’s definition of “em-
ployer” as that term had been construed in Title VII precedent). 
 62. See, e.g., Frizzell, 906 F. Supp. at 449. 
 63. See, e.g., Carter, 977 F. Supp. at 759 (“Personal liability for violations 
of Federal employment laws generally has been rejected . . . [and] the term 
‘employer’ in the FMLA should be construed consistently . . . .”). 
 64. See, e.g., Richardson v. CVS Corp., 207 F. Supp. 2d 733, 743 (E.D. 
Tenn. 2001) (“[T]his Court is fortunately able to review the decisions of various 
district courts who have dealt with the issue of individual liability under the 
FLSA. The Court is persuaded by the reasoning of these later opinions and 
respectfully declines to concur with the decision rendered in Frizzell.”). 
 65. Compare, e.g., Freemon v. Foley, 911 F. Supp. 326, 330 (N.D. Ill. 1995) 
(“[W]e look to the FLSA . . . to enlighten our interpretation of the term ‘em-
ployer’ under the FMLA.”), with Modica v. Taylor, 465 F.3d 174, 186–87 (5th 
Cir. 2006) (commenting that “[t]he definition of ‘employer’ under the FMLA is 
very similar to the definition of ‘employer’ under the FLSA” and relying on 
circuit precedent to hold that public sector supervisors may be individually 
liable under the FMLA). 
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port their position.66 The discussion below describes how mod-
ern circuit courts addressing the individual liability question as 
to public sector supervisors have both drawn from and adapted 
the reasoning of earlier courts that analyzed the same question 
in relation to the private sector. 
1. Repeating History: The Second, Third, Fifth, and Eighth 
Circuits’ Holdings in Favor of Individual Liability for Public 
Sector Supervisors 
The Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have held that indi-
vidual liability may be imposed on public sector supervisors,67 
and the Second Circuit has held that individual liability may be 
imposed without specifying whether its holding is confined to 
the private sector.68 These courts have reasoned that the plain 
language of the FMLA’s definition of “employer” justifies the 
imposition of individual liability on public sector supervisors.69 
Additionally, these courts have echoed the arguments that 
emerged in the early 1990s regarding the similarity between 
the FMLA’s and FLSA’s definitions of “employer.”70 Looking 
beyond the language of the FMLA, the Third Circuit noted that 
the Department of Labor’s implementing regulations confirm 
that the FMLA allows for the imposition of individual liability 
on both private and public sector supervisors.71 Finally, the 
 
 66. See, e.g., infra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 67. Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 417 
(3d Cir. 2012); Modica, 465 F.3d at 187; see also Darby v. Bratch, 287 F.3d 
673, 681 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 68. See Graziadio v. Culinary Inst. of Am., 817 F.3d 415, 422 (2d Cir. 
2016). 
 69. See, e.g., Modica, 465 F.3d at 184; Darby, 287 F.3d at 681. 
 70. Compare, e.g., Graziadio, 817 F.3d at 422 (citing several other federal 
court decisions and agreeing “that the standards used to evaluate ‘employers’ 
under the FLSA should therefore be applied to govern the FMLA as well”), 
and Modica, 465 F.3d at 186 (“Congress . . . chose to make the definition of 
‘employer’ materially identical to that in the FLSA mean[ing] that decisions 
interpreting the FLSA offer the best guidance for construing the term ‘em-
ployer’ as it is used in the FMLA.”), with Freemon, 911 F. Supp. at 330 (“[W]e 
look to the FLSA . . . to enlighten our interpretation of the term ‘employer’ 
under the FMLA.”). 
 71. See Haybarger, 667 F.3d at 414 (laying out the text of the relevant 
regulations and asserting that “the Department of Labor responded to con-
cerns of imposing individual liability under the FMLA by noting that the Fair 
Labor Standards Act . . . which defines ‘employer’ similarly to the FMLA, al-
ready holds ‘corporate officers, managers and supervisors acting in the inter-
est of an employer . . . individually liable.’” (quoting Summary of Major Com-
ments for the FMLA Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 2181 (Jan. 6, 1995))). 
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Eighth Circuit asserted that there are no relevant differences 
between private and public sector supervisors such that indi-
vidual FMLA liability should be imposed on the former, but not 
the latter, group.72 Thus, the reasoning of the Second, Third, 
Fifth, and Eighth Circuits is similar to the reasoning that car-
ried the day with respect to private sector individual liability 
shortly after the FMLA was enacted. 
In addition to drawing from the reasoning of 1990s courts 
that analyzed the FMLA individual liability question as to the 
private sector, two circuit courts involved in the current split 
have opted to apply iterations of the FLSA “control test.”73 In 
Haybarger v. Lawrence County Adult Probation and Parole, the 
Third Circuit adopted an “economic reality” test for determin-
ing when a public sector supervisor is subject to individual lia-
bility under the FMLA.74 In so doing, the Haybarger court noted 
that “whether a person functions as an employer depends on 
the totality of the circumstances,” including factors such as 
whether the person possesses power to hire and fire, control 
employee work schedules or conditions of employment, or de-
termine the rate and method of payment.75 In Graziadio v. Cul-
inary Institute of America, the Second Circuit also adopted an 
“economic reality” test and indicated that, in applying the test, 
it would “consider a ‘non-exclusive and overlapping set of fac-
tors,’” intended “to ‘encompass . . . the totality of the circum-
stances.’”76 The Second Circuit’s “economic reality” test includes 
the following factors: ability to hire and fire employees, super-
vision and control of employee work schedules or conditions of 
employment, determination of the rate and method of payment, 
and maintenance of employment records.77 Thus, it appears 
that Haybarger and Graziadio may foreshadow the develop-
ment of more “control tests” for determining individual liability 
for public sector supervisors under the FMLA, a phenomenon 
 
 72. See Darby, 287 F.3d at 681. 
 73. See Graziadio, 817 F.3d at 422–23; Haybarger, 667 F.3d at 417–18. 
 74. See Haybarger, 667 F.3d at 417–18 (pointing particularly to an itera-
tion of the “economic reality” test articulated by the Second Circuit). 
 75. Id. (applying the factors enumerated by the Second Circuit in Herman 
v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
 76. Graziadio, 817 F.3d at 422 (first quoting Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 
355 F.3d 61, 75 (2d Cir. 2003); then quoting Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 
172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
 77. See id. 
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that occurred when the individual liability question was con-
sidered with respect to private sector supervisors.78 
2. The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits’ Refusal To Impose 
Individual Liability on Public Sector Supervisors 
Contrary to the approach adopted by their sister circuits, 
the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have declined to impose indi-
vidual liability on public sector supervisors.79 In holding against 
individual liability for public sector supervisors, the Sixth and 
Eleventh Circuits have not relied on the line of reasoning com-
paring the FMLA to Title VII,80 under which individual liability 
is not imposed on supervisors.81 While the Sixth Circuit had 
held in favor of individual liability for private sector supervi-
sors before deciding Mitchell v. Chapman,82 the Eleventh Cir-
cuit had not addressed the question of individual FMLA liabil-
ity prior to deciding Wascura v. Carver.83 In Wascura v. Carver, 
the Eleventh Circuit noted the similarity between the FLSA 
and FMLA’s definitions of “employer,” and held against impos-
ing individual FMLA liability on a public sector supervisor be-
cause Eleventh Circuit FLSA precedent had done the same.84 In 
Mitchell v. Chapman, the Sixth Circuit asserted that principles 
of statutory interpretation justified holding against individual 
liability for public sector supervisors under the FMLA.85 Thus, 
 
 78. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
 79. See Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 829 (6th Cir. 2003); Wascura 
v. Carver, 169 F.3d 683, 687 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 80. See Mitchell, 343 F.3d at 825–33; Wascura, 169 F.3d at 685–87. 
 81. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 82. See Mitchell, 343 F.3d at 830 n.22 (noting the Sixth Circuit’s “prior 
determination that the FMLA extends individual liability to private-sector 
employers”). The Sixth Circuit justified its differing treatment of private and 
public sector supervisors on statutory interpretation grounds. See id. at 829–
32. 
 83. See Wascura, 169 F.3d at 685 (“This is our first occasion to address the 
meaning of ‘employer’ under the FMLA.”). 
 84. See id. at 686–87. 
 85. See Mitchell, 343 F.3d at 829–33. The Sixth Circuit analyzed the 
FMLA’s definition of “employer” in the context of the entire statute, citing the 
following justifications for its holding: 
First, Section 2611(4)(A) segregates the provision imposing individual 
liability from the public agency provision. Second, an interpretation 
that commingles the individual liability provision with the public 
agency provision renders certain provisions of the statute superfluous 
[e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(B) (2012), which states that “a public agency 
shall be considered to be a person engaged in commerce or in an in-
dustry affecting commerce”] and results in several oddities. Final-
ly, . . . the FMLA distinguishes its definition of employer from that 
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the Eleventh Circuit utilized the reasoning of the majority view 
comparing the FMLA to the FLSA,86 and the Sixth Circuit re-
lied on what it perceived as a statutory distinction between pri-
vate and public sector supervisors in order to hold against im-
posing individual liability.87 
Additionally, at least one court has engaged in a critical 
analysis of whether imposing individual liability on public sec-
tor supervisors would serve Congress’s purposes in enacting the 
FMLA. In Keene v. Rinaldi, a Postal Service employee brought 
an FMLA action against the Postal Service and his managers.88 
In holding that supervisors of public agencies were not “em-
ployers” under the FMLA, the court asserted that “[t]here is no 
reason to think that Congress would have intended subsection 
4(A)(ii)(I) to have included all of an employee’s supervisors as 
potential employers.”89 Rather, the court read the FMLA’s defi-
nition of “employer” as an attempt by Congress to “ensure that 
someone will be responsible for paying for or rectifying a FMLA 
violation.”90 The court noted that an interpretation of “employ-
er” that included supervisors would fill FMLA cases with “per-
sonal disputes” and “matters of office politics.”91 Finally, the 
court acknowledged that it would be strange for a plaintiff-
employee to name as an “employer” a supervisor who may hold 
a position barely higher than that of the plaintiff-employee 
himself or herself.92 In the absence of guidance from Congress 
in the form of clear statutory language or legislative history, 
the Keene court conducted a policy analysis to determine 
whether the FMLA’s goals would be effectuated by imposing 
individual liability on public sector supervisors.93 
 
provided in the FLSA by separating the individual liability and public 
agency provisions. 
Id. at 832. 
 86. See Wascura, 169 F.3d at 686 (“[W]e look to FLSA decisions to deter-
mine whether the term ‘employer’ includes a public official . . . .”). 
 87. See supra note 85. 
 88. 127 F. Supp. 2d 770, 772 (M.D.N.C. 2000). 
 89. Id. at 777. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 776–77. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See id. 
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D. THE CURRENT FMLA INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY SCORECARD 
In sum, a majority of courts resolved the individual liabil-
ity question in the private sector in favor of individual liability 
for supervisors. Most courts relied on the similarity between 
the FLSA and FMLA’s definitions of “employer” and the fact 
that individual liability may be imposed under the FLSA to 
find that individual liability could also be imposed under the 
FMLA.94 While some courts used a functionalist analytical lens 
and compared the FMLA to Title VII,95 an antidiscrimination 
statute which does not impose individual liability, this line of 
reasoning did not carry the day. 
With respect to the public sector, the question of individual 
liability for supervisors remains unresolved. The Third, Fifth, 
and Eighth Circuits have held in favor of imposing individual 
liability on public sector supervisors,96 and the Second Circuit 
has held that individual liability may attach to supervisors 
without specifying whether that holding is confined to the pri-
vate sector context.97 In contrast, the Sixth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits have held against imposing such liability on public sector 
supervisors.98 Among other justifications, the former group of 
courts has relied on the similarity of the FLSA and FMLA defi-
nitions of “employer” in opting to impose individual liability on 
public sector supervisors,99 while the latter group of courts has 
resisted imposing such liability on public sector supervisors on 
precedential and statutory interpretation grounds.100 The un-
 
 94. See, e.g., Knussman v. Maryland, 935 F. Supp. 659, 664 (D. Md. 1996); 
Freemon v. Foley, 911 F. Supp. 326, 330–32 (N.D. Ill. 1995); McKiernan v. 
Smith-Edwards-Dunlap Co., Civ. A. No. 95-1175, 1995 WL 311393, at *3 (E.D. 
Pa. May 17, 1995). 
 95. See, e.g., Carter v. Rental Unif. Serv. of Culpeper, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 
753, 759 (W.D. Va. 1997); Frizzell v. Sw. Motor Freight, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 441, 
449 (E.D. Tenn. 1995). 
 96. See Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 
417 (3d Cir. 2012); Modica v. Taylor, 465 F.3d 174, 187 (5th Cir. 2006); Darby 
v. Bratch, 287 F.3d 673, 681 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 97. See Graziadio v. Culinary Inst. of Am., 817 F.3d 415, 422 (2d Cir. 
2016). 
 98. See Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 829 (6th Cir. 2003); Wascura 
v. Carver, 169 F.3d 683, 687 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 99. See, e.g., Haybarger, 667 F.3d at 414. 
 100. See Mitchell, 343 F.3d at 829–33 (focusing its opinion on an “examina-
tion of the FMLA’s text and structure”); Wascura, 169 F.3d at 686–87 (relying 
on the Eleventh Circuit’s rationale in Welch v. Laney, 57 F.3d 1004 (11th Cir. 
1995)). 
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predictability and lack of uniformity resulting from the current 
circuit split demand a swift resolution. 
II.  BAD PRECEDENT PRODUCES BAD RESULTS: THE 
NEGATIVE IMPACT OF PRIVATE SECTOR INDIVIDUAL 
LIABILITY ANALYSES ON SUBSEQUENT PUBLIC SECTOR 
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY ANALYSES   
Unsurprisingly, circuit courts attempting to resolve the in-
dividual liability question as to public sector supervisors have 
looked for guidance in the opinions of mid-1990s and early 
2000s courts that analyzed the same issue with respect to pri-
vate sector supervisors.101 But while adherence to precedent is 
often beneficial, the perpetuation of unpredictability and ab-
breviated analyses is detrimental when it disadvantages both 
supervisors and the employers for whom they work. Section A 
highlights two issues with 1990s and early 2000s courts’ dis-
posal of the individual liability question with respect to private 
sector supervisors: the creation of several different judicial 
“control tests” and insufficient analyses of the relevant differ-
ences between the FLSA and FMLA. Section B discusses how 
these analytical issues have been perpetuated by modern cir-
cuit courts, whose hands are tied by bad precedent as they ad-
dress the individual liability question with regard to public sec-
tor supervisors. 
A. THE PROBLEMS WITH EARLY CASES FINDING IN FAVOR OF 
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY FOR PRIVATE SECTOR SUPERVISORS 
The reasoning of early court opinions holding that individ-
ual liability could be imposed on private sector supervisors was, 
in a sense, paradoxical: these opinions based the bulk of their 
analyses on the similarities between the FMLA and FLSA’s 
definition of “employer,” but adopted a multiplicity of “control 
tests” that were based only loosely on the FLSA’s more definite 
“control test.”102 Additionally, many of these early opinions paid 
 
 101. See Scott Baker & Anup Malani, Do Judges Actually Care About the 
Law? Evidence from Circuit Split Data 3 (Sept. 17, 2015) (unpublished faculty 
workshop paper) (on file with Washington University School of Law), https:// 
www.law.wustl.edu/faculty/documents/Workshops/Do%20judges%20actually% 
20care%20about%20the%20law%20150914.pdf (studying judicial behavior and 
concluding that “judges do learn from prior judges and are not purely political 
actors”). 
 102. The FLSA’s control test limits the individuals upon which individual 
liability may be imposed. See Sperino, supra note 37, at 196 (“With few excep-
tions, the FLSA’s definition of ‘employer’ has been interpreted to allow indi-
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little or no attention to the relevant differences between the 
FMLA and the FLSA.103 Section A provides a critical examina-
tion of the FMLA’s several judicial “control tests” and the 
dearth of FMLA-specific analysis in early individual liability 
cases. 
1. A Multiplicity of “Control Tests” 
While the concept of an FMLA “control test” is not intrinsi-
cally undesirable, FMLA “control tests” have proven problemat-
ic in practice due to courts’ tendency to emphasize different as-
pects of the employment relationship104 and supplement their 
“control tests” with nebulous “totality of the circumstances” or 
similar language that allows for unpredictable application of 
such tests.105 Early litigation over individual FMLA liability for 
private sector supervisors produced several “control tests,” each 
placing different levels of emphasis on the various ways that an 
employer exercises control over its employees’ employment.106 
For example, while some courts have emphasized a supervisor’s 
power to grant employee leave requests in holding that a pri-
 
vidual liability only when the defendant is a high-level individual within the 
company and has control over the operation of the company or over wage and 
hour policy.”). In contrast, iterations of FMLA “control tests” that emerged in 
the mid-1990s provided that a wider variety of private sector individuals could 
be held individually liable. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 103. See, e.g., Meara v. Bennett, 27 F. Supp. 2d 288, 291 (D. Mass. 1998) 
(denying individual defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of 
whether he constituted an “employer” for FMLA purposes by noting that “nu-
merous courts” have found individual liability under the FMLA “based on the 
similarity between the language of that statute and the FLSA”); McKiernan v. 
Smith-Edwards-Dunlap Co., Civ. A. No. 95-1175, 1995 WL 311393, at *3 (E.D. 
Pa. May 17, 1995) (devoting one paragraph to dismissing a private sector su-
pervisor’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether he constitut-
ed an “employer” within the meaning of the FMLA and relying solely on FLSA 
case law to do so). 
 104. See infra notes 106–08 and accompanying text. 
 105. See, e.g., Smith v. Ctr. for Organ Recovery & Educ., Civ. A. No. 13-428, 
2013 WL 4049550, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2013) (delineating a multi-factor 
“control test” for determining whether an individual constitutes an “employer” 
for FMLA purposes, but noting that “[t]hese factors . . . are not dispositive, 
and the Court must consider any other relevant evidence of a supervisory rela-
tionship”); Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 
418 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[W]hether a person functions as an employer depends on 
the totality of the circumstances rather than on ‘technical concepts of the em-
ployment relationship.’” (quoting Hodgson v. Anheim & Neely, Inc., 444 F.2d 
609, 612 (3d Cir. 1971), rev’d sub nom, Brennan v. Anheim & Neely, Inc., 410 
U.S. 512 (1973))). 
 106. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
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vate sector supervisor may be found individually liable,107 oth-
ers have held that private sector employees must hold high-
level company positions in order to open themselves up to indi-
vidual liability.108 While courts interpreting the FLSA’s defini-
tion of “employer” have largely imposed individual liability on 
only high-level employees,109 some courts have adopted FMLA 
“control tests” that allow for individual FMLA liability to at-
tach to even low-level employees.110 Thus, as Professor Sandra 
Sperino notes, “individuals ranging from low-level supervisors 
to business owners may be jointly and severally liable for 
FMLA violations.”111 
 Several problems inhere in the inconsistency of the 
FMLA “control tests” that emerged in the mid-1990s. First, 
“control tests” that allow for individual liability to be imposed 
on low-level private employees are arguably in conflict with the 
Department of Labor’s regulations, which specify that “individ-
uals such as corporate officers” may be held individually liable 
for FMLA violations.112 By specifically identifying “corporate 
officers,” the Department of Labor arguably intended that only 
high-level employees be held individually liable. Additionally, 
unpredictability resulting from variation in and judicial ma-
nipulation of “control tests” provides little guidance to supervi-
sors,113 who could be on the hook for paying high trial costs and 
 
 107. See, e.g., Bryant v. Delbar Prods., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 799, 808 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1998). 
 108. See, e.g., Brunelle v. Cytec Plastics, Inc., 225 F. Supp. 2d 67, 82 (D. 
Me. 2002) (noting that, while the supervisor in question was responsible for 
making decisions contributing to the alleged denial of the employee’s FMLA 
leave request, “as a front-line supervisor—at the bottom of four rungs of man-
agement—he simply was not a prominent enough player in [the employer’s] 
operations to be considered an ‘employer’ for purposes of the FMLA”); see also 
Sperino, supra note 37, at 214–15. 
 109. See, e.g., Dole v. Cont’l Cuisine, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 799, 802–03 (E.D. 
Ark. 1990) (holding that an individual was not an “employer” for FLSA pur-
poses because he did not hire and fire employees, control the business’s meth-
ods of operation, or control the payroll); see also Sperino, supra note 37, at 
198–99, 199 n.130. 
 110. See, e.g., Beyer v. Elkay Mfg. Co., No. 97 C 50067, 1997 WL 587487, at 
*1–4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 1997) (refusing to dismiss a low-level supervisor as a 
defendant, despite the fact that his sole involvement in the alleged FMLA vio-
lation was telling the plaintiff-employee that her absence would be counted as 
vacation time); see also Sperino, supra note 37, at 213–14. 
 111. See Sperino, supra note 37, at 177. 
 112. 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(d) (2015) (emphasis added). 
 113. See infra note 115. 
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damage awards should they be held individually liable.114 Final-
ly, the wide variety of “control tests” and broad judicial discre-
tion in applying them leads to a lack of uniformity and predict-
ability for employers who are forced to guess at the law when 
instructing their supervisors as to the circumstances under 
which they could open themselves up to individual liability un-
der the FMLA.115 
 A brief hypothetical illustrates how the multiplicity of 
FMLA “control tests” can disadvantage an employer seeking to 
avoid FMLA violations and candidly advise its supervisors re-
garding their liability exposure. Imagine a national corporation 
with branches in Chicago and Detroit, among other locations. 
The corporation decides that it would like to create an FMLA 
handbook to be distributed to supervisors at all of its branches. 
This handbook would instruct supervisors on how to uphold the 
terms of the FMLA and would also advise supervisors as to 
their liability exposure. When the corporation researches case 
law from Illinois and Michigan, it realizes that the liability ex-
posure of its low-level supervisors is vastly different between 
the two states. In Illinois, one need only have exercised some 
supervisory role over a suing employee and interfere with the 
suing employee’s rights under the FMLA to be held individual-
ly liable.116 By contrast, Michigan employs an “economic reali-
ties” test and holds individually liable only those with “opera-
 
 114. See Denise Kay, Ann E. Employee v. You: Personal Liability and the 
HR Professional, HR.COM (July 1, 2005), http://www.hr.com/SITEFORUM?& 
t=/Default/gateway&i=1116423256281&application=story&active=no&Parent 
ID=1119278127660&StoryID=1120080532484&xref (“It may be financially 
devastating for an individual expected to foot a legal bill on his or her own. 
The estimated cost of defending a lawsuit, excluding trial costs, is $150,000.”). 
 115. See id. (noting that “HR professionals and organization officials grap-
ple with FMLA issues” with “little definitive guidance,” yet can nevertheless 
“face liability for their involvement” in violations); Grant B. Osborne, Supervi-
sor to Employee: “You Want FMLA Leave? No Problem!,” N.C. LAB. & EMP. 
BLOG (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.wardandsmith.com/blog/supervisor-to 
-employee-you-want-fmla-leave-no-problem (“Employers that wish to be hon-
est with supervisory employees who field and handle the administration of 
requests for leaves of absence made pursuant to the FMLA should consider 
including the following admonition in these employees’ job descriptions: 
‘Warning: Acceptance of this job may enhance your career. It may also get you 
sued.’”). 
 116. See Llante v. Am. NTN Bearing Mfg. Corp., No. 99 C 3091, 1999 WL 
1045219, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 1999) (holding that the plaintiff-employee’s 
allegations that the defendant-supervisors “exercised some supervisory role 
over him and interfered with his rights under the FMLA [were] enough to 
survive dismissal”). 
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tional control of significant aspects of the corporation’s day to 
day functions.”117 Noticing the wide variety of “control tests” 
across jurisdictions, the corporation is left with a couple of op-
tions: (1) expend valuable time and resources to create a juris-
diction-by-jurisdiction handbook for its supervisors or (2) give 
up on the handbook and instruct supervisors to be overly cau-
tious in making FMLA leave determinations, or risk being held 
individually liable for FMLA violations. Neither option is par-
ticularly attractive. This hypothetical illustrates how the wide 
variety of judicial “control tests” and consequent unpredictabil-
ity of liability exposure renders hollow the FMLA’s promise to 
accomplish its purposes “in a manner that accommodates the 
legitimate interests of employers.”118 
2. Inadequate Analyses of the Differences Between the FMLA 
and the FLSA 
In addition to providing little clarity as to when a private 
sector supervisor may be held individually liable under the 
FMLA, early court opinions addressing the individual liability 
issue disposed of it by focusing almost exclusively on similari-
ties between the FMLA and the FLSA.119 Although the FMLA 
and the FLSA do define “employer” similarly and the FLSA 
does allow for the imposition of individual liability on supervi-
sors, the analyses of many early courts stopped here. 
Courts in the mid-1990s and early 2000s should have con-
sidered the relevant differences between the FMLA and the 
FLSA. First, as Boyd Rogers argues, “the FMLA explicitly rec-
ognizes that it is an anti-discrimination statute, and not a labor 
statute such as the FLSA.”120 This assertion is supported by the 
fact that Congress cited the prevention of sex discrimination as 
a core purpose of the FMLA.121 As will be discussed in Part 
III.B, infra, courts have held that several prominent federal 
antidiscrimination statutes allow for the imposition of 
respondeat superior liability, not individual liability.122 Second, 
 
 117. Reich v. Midwest Plastic Eng’g, Inc., No. 1:94-CV-525, 1995 WL 
478884, at *6 (W.D. Mich. June 6, 1995) (quoting Dole v. Elliott Travel & 
Tours, Inc., 942 F.2d 962, 966 (6th Cir. 1991)). 
 118. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(4) (2012). 
 119. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 120. Boyd Rogers, Note, Individual Liability Under the Family and Medi-
cal Leave Act of 1993: A Senseless Detour on the Road to a Flexible Workplace, 
63 BROOK. L. REV. 1299, 1332 (1997) (footnote omitted). 
 121. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(4)–(5). 
 122. See infra notes 158–59 and accompanying text. 
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the FLSA’s remedies differ based on whether the violator is the 
employer entity or an individual supervisor, while the FMLA’s 
remedies make no such distinction.123 The remedies provided for 
by the FMLA are remedies that an individual supervisor is ill-
equipped to provide.124 Finally, the FLSA is a strict compliance 
statute, and Congress included no language regarding the in-
terests of employers in the FLSA.125 In contrast, the FMLA pro-
vides that its purposes should be accomplished “in a manner 
that accommodates the legitimate interests of employers.”126 
Surely, one of the “legitimate interests” of an employer is the 
ability to structure its business in such a way as to avoid legal 
liability. As discussed in Part II.A.1, the current array of “con-
trol tests” and their vulnerability to judicial manipulation pre-
vents employers from predicting with any certainty what em-
ployees or supervisors will be subject to individual FMLA liabil-
ity. Had the courts addressing the individual liability question 
in the private sector examined the differences between the 
FLSA and FMLA in any detail, they may have questioned the 
prudence of imposing individual liability on private sector su-
pervisors. 
B. HANDS TIED: HOW HISTORY IS REPEATING ITSELF IN 
COURTS’ ANALYSES OF INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY FOR PUBLIC 
SECTOR SUPERVISORS 
Courts involved in the current circuit split regarding indi-
vidual FMLA liability for public sector supervisors have drawn 
from the reasoning of the earlier decisions addressing this 
question as to private sector supervisors.127 Part II.B focuses on 
two results of modern circuit courts’ reliance on earlier courts’ 
reasoning. First, the analyses of two modern courts foreshadow 
the creation of even more “control tests.”128 Second, the analyses 
 
 123. See Rogers, supra note 120, at 1332–34. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 216(a)–
(b) (subjecting a “person” to a fine of up to $10,000 and/or to imprisonment of 
up to six months and subjecting an “employer” to liability for the amount of 
money that the aggrieved employee would have received but for the violation, 
plus possible liquidated damages and attorney’s fees), with id. § 2617(a) (stat-
ing that “employers” are subject to providing an aggrieved employee backpay, 
reinstatement, and possible liquidated damages and attorney’s fees). 
 124. See infra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 125. See 29 U.S.C. § 202 (putting forth Congress’sfindings and policy, but 
lacking any such language). 
 126. Id. § 2601(b)(3). 
 127. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 128. See Graziadio v. Culinary Inst. of Am., 817 F.3d 415, 422–23 (2d Cir. 
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by courts involved in the current split are plagued by a contin-
ued failure to address the relevant differences between the 
FLSA and FMLA.129 
1. Graziadio, Haybarger, and the Foreshadowing of More 
“Control Tests” 
In Graziadio v. Culinary Institute of America and 
Haybarger v. Lawrence County Adult Probation & Parole, the 
Second and Third Circuits, respectively, applied “economic real-
ity” tests to determine whether supervisors were “employers” 
for purposes of the FMLA, listing several relevant factors.130 
However, both circuit courts’ “control tests” leave room for judi-
cial manipulation. The Third Circuit added the following cryp-
tic postscript to its “control test”: “Whether a person functions 
as an employer depends on the totality of the circumstances 
rather than on ‘technical concepts of the employment relation-
ship.’”131 And while the Third Circuit’s language leaves wide 
leeway for the exercise of judicial discretion, it is arguable that 
the Second Circuit’s test allows for even more wiggle room for 
courts: the Graziadio court included both “totality of the cir-
cumstances” language and commented that the four factors 
listed by the court constituted “a nonexclusive and overlapping 
set of factors.”132 The malleability of judicial tests including “to-
tality of the circumstances” language has been recognized with 
respect to several areas of law,133 and the Second and Third Cir-
 
2016); Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 417–
18 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 129. See, e.g., Darby v. Bratch, 287 F.3d 673, 681–82 (8th Cir. 2002) (stat-
ing that “the plain language of the [FMLA]” dictates that individual liability 
attaches to public sector supervisors). 
 130. See Haybarger, 667 F.3d at 418–19 (noting that a Second Circuit 
FLSA case listed the following as relevant factors in assessing the economic 
reality of the employment situation: (1) power to hire and fire; (2) supervision 
and control of employee work schedules or conditions of employment; (3) abil-
ity to determine the rate and method of payment; and (4) responsibility to 
maintain employment records (citing Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 
F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999))); supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text. 
 131. Haybarger, 667 F.3d at 418 (quoting Hodgson v. Arnheim & Neely, 
Inc., 444 F.2d 609, 612 (3d Cir. 1971)). 
 132. Graziadio, 817 F.3d at 422 (quoting Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 
F.3d 61, 75 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
 133. See, e.g., Jordan Gross, If Skilling Can’t Get a Change of Venue, Who 
Can? Salvaging Common Law Implied Bias Principles from the Wreckage of 
the Constitutional Pretrial Publicity Standard, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 575, 600 
(2013) (“In practice, totality of the circumstances inquiry has proven to permit 
so much decisional latitude that it has produced a change-of-venue jurispru-
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cuit’s use of the phrase suggests that courts will continue to 
attach addendums to their multi-factor FMLA “control tests,” 
inviting judicial manipulation and leading to unpredictable ap-
plication of such tests. Thus, Graziadio and Haybarger fore-
shadow an outcome similar to that which resulted from the ear-
lier dispute over individual liability for private sector supervi-
sors: more pliable “control tests,” less uniformity, and less pre-
dictability for employers and supervisors. 
2. Courts’ Continued Failure To Acknowledge Differences 
Between the FMLA and the FLSA 
Circuit courts involved in the current split have noted that 
there are no relevant distinctions between public and private 
sector supervisors for FMLA liability purposes.134 After elimi-
nating this difference as a possible point of departure from ear-
ly decisions finding in favor of individual FMLA liability for 
private sector supervisors, courts involved in the current split 
have replicated the brief “FLSA individual liability, therefore 
FMLA liability” analysis described in Part II.A.2.135 Although 
the failure of the modern circuit courts to address the relevant 
differences between the FLSA and the FMLA is disappoint-
ing,136 it is unsurprising given the almost total lack of such 
analysis in early decisions finding in favor of liability for pri-
vate sector supervisors.137 
 
dence with little or no predictive or prudential value.”); Meghan Riley, Com-
ment, American Courts Are Drowning in the “Gene Pool”: Excavating the Slip-
pery Slope Mechanisms Behind Judicial Endorsement of DNA Databases, 39 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 115, 127 (2005) (“[Some critics] characterize the Fourth 
Amendment ‘totality of the circumstances’ balancing approach (used by many 
courts to justify DNA collection from convicts) as a ‘malleable and boundless 
standard.’” (citing United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 860 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting))). In a prominent federal administrative law case, 
the late Justice Antonin Scalia remarked that “th’ol’ ‘totality of the circum-
stances’ test” is the test “most beloved by a court unwilling to be held to rules 
(and most feared by litigants who want to know what to expect).” United 
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 134. See, e.g., Darby v. Bratch, 287 F.3d 673, 681 (8th Cir. 2002) (“We see 
no reason to distinguish employers in the public sector from those in the pri-
vate sector.”). 
 135. See, e.g., Graziadio, 817 F.3d at 422; Modica v. Taylor, 465 F.3d 174, 
186–87 (5th Cir. 2006); Darby, 287 F.3d at 680–81 (noting the similarities 
between the FLSA and FMLA definitions of “employer” before finding that the 
“plain” language of the FMLA allowed for the imposition of individual liability 
on public sector supervisors). 
 136. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 137. See, e.g., Mercer v. Borden, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1191 (C.D. Cal. 1998) 
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C. WHEN PRACTICE DOESN’T MAKE PERFECT: THE NEGATIVE 
IMPACT OF BAD PRECEDENT ON THE PUBLIC SECTOR INDIVIDUAL 
LIABILITY CIRCUIT SPLIT 
In sum, courts involved in the current circuit split regard-
ing individual liability for public sector supervisors have turned 
to precedent addressing the individual liability question with 
respect to the private sector for guidance. Such reliance is prob-
lematic due to the courts’ production of an array of indefinite 
judicial tests138 and failure to discuss the ways in which the 
FMLA differs from the FLSA.139 Thus far, circuit courts’ reli-
ance on private sector individual liability precedent has pro-
duced more FMLA “control tests”140 and has threatened to con-
tinue the trend of omitting FMLA-specific analyses.141 Part III, 
below, suggests a solution that would halt these negative 
trends and settle the current circuit split regarding individual 
liability for public sector supervisors. 
III.  CLARITY THROUGH CONGRESS: AMENDING THE 
FMLA TO PRECLUDE INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY FOR 
SUPERVISORS AND IMPOSE RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR 
LIABILITY   
The current circuit split regarding individual FMLA liabil-
ity for public sector supervisors presents an opportunity for 
Congress to declare, for the first time, its intent regarding the 
imposition of individual liability under the FMLA.142 While the 
 
(providing no FMLA-specific policy analysis and concluding that “[s]ince the 
definition of ‘employer’ is identical to the definition of ‘employer’ in the FLSA, 
the Court holds individuals are potentially subject to liability under the 
FMLA”); Johnson v. A.P. Prods., Ltd., 934 F. Supp. 625, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(giving no FMLA-specific policy justifications before stating that “[i]n light of 
the expansive interpretation given the term ‘employer’ in the FLSA, this Court 
follows Freemon in holding that the FMLA ‘extends to all those who controlled 
in whole or in part [plaintiff ’s] ability to take a leave of absence and return to 
her position.’” (citing Freemon v. Foley, 911 F. Supp. 326, 331 (N.D. Ill. 
1995))). 
 138. See supra notes 106–11 and accompanying text. 
 139. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 140. For examples of modern courts producing “control tests,” see 
Graziadio, 817 F.3d at 422–23, and Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty. Adult Prob. & 
Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 418–19 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 141. See, e.g., Modica v. Taylor, 465 F.3d 174, 186–87 (5th Cir. 2006) 
(demonstrating how modern courts rely on similarities between the FLSA and 
FMLA, not FMLA-specific arguments, in their analysis); Darby v. Bratch, 287 
F.3d 673, 680–81 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 142. A discussion of individual liability is notably absent from the FMLA’s 
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Supreme Court or the Department of Labor could also take 
steps to resolve the split, Congress is best equipped to defini-
tively settle the issue for the reasons discussed in Section A. In 
Section B, this Note proposes that Congress amend the FMLA 
to preclude individual liability for both private and public sec-
tor supervisors and, instead, impose respondeat superior liabil-
ity.143 
A. WHY CONGRESSIONAL ACTION IS THE APPROPRIATE VEHICLE 
FOR CHANGE 
Congressional action is the best means of resolving the 
current circuit split because the answer to the individual liabil-
ity problem lies in Congress’s intent. The remainder of Section 
A notes that the Supreme Court has thus far declined to resolve 
the split and asserts that a congressional amendment would 
provide a speedy and definitive solution to a problem that has 
vexed the courts since the FMLA was enacted. 
1. The Supreme Court Has Declined To Resolve the Current 
Circuit Split 
As recently as 2004, the Supreme Court declined to step in 
and resolve the circuit split regarding individual FMLA liabil-
ity for public sector supervisors.144 And while some may view 
the Supreme Court’s failure to resolve the split as a suggestion 
that the FMLA individual liability issue is unimportant, it is 
also possible that the Court is waiting for Congress to step in 
and pronounce its intent regarding individual FMLA liability.145 
 
legislative history. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 143. Respondeat superior operates to impose liability on an employer “for 
torts [or statutory violations] committed by employees while acting within the 
scope of their employment.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (AM. 
LAW INST. 2006). 
 144. Mitchell v. Chapman, 542 U.S. 937 (2004) (denying petition for certio-
rari). For a discussion of the Sixth Circuit’s holding in this case, see supra 
notes 85–87 and accompanying text. 
 145. In a study analyzing congressional responses to federal circuit court 
decisions, Stefanie A. Lindquist and David A. Yalof noted the following with 
regard to Congress’srole in resolving circuit splits: “Congress has assumed 
some role for itself as resolver of conflicts among the federal circuits, whether 
it does so before an interested Supreme Court seizes on that opportunity or (as 
is most often the case) because the Supreme Court itself shows no interest in 
doing so.” Stefanie A. Lindquist & David A. Yalof, Congressional Responses to 
Federal Circuit Court Decisions, 85 JUDICATURE 60, 67 (2001). While Lind-
quist and Yalof concluded that Congress was “not nearly as active as the Su-
preme Court” in resolving circuit splits, they found that Congress “sought to 
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Alternatively, the Supreme Court may expect that the current 
circuit split regarding individual liability for public sector su-
pervisors will eventually be resolved by the emergence of a ma-
jority rule in favor of such liability, as happened with individu-
al liability for supervisors in the private sector.146 However, as 
discussed in Part II.A.1, such a “solution” would be no solution 
at all, given the unpredictability stemming from variation in 
and judicial manipulation of FMLA “control tests.” 
2. The Need for a Swift and Definitive Solution 
Quite apart from the Supreme Court’s refusal to resolve 
the current circuit split, Congress could settle the split more 
conclusively than any judicial resolution by amending the 
FMLA and expressly stating its intent.147 Given the FMLA’s 
statutory ambiguity and absence of on-point legislative histo-
ry,148 the individual liability problem centers on Congress’s in-
tent. Much of the reasoning of courts finding for the imposition 
of individual liability on public or private sector supervisors is 
based on the assumption that Congress intended for FMLA lia-
bility to parallel FLSA liability.149 Similarly, the Department of 
Labor’s implementing regulations place great emphasis on the 
similarity between the FLSA and FMLA definitions of “employ-
er” before stating that “[a]s under the FLSA, individuals such 
as corporate officers ‘acting in the interest of an employer’ are 
 
amend existing statutes or to pass new legislation to resolve at least 19 in-
stances of conflict among the circuits” between the years 1990 and 1998. Id. at 
66–67. 
 146. See ELLEN E. MCLAUGHLIN, SEYFARTH SHAW, LLP, CURRENT DEVEL-
OPMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT LAW: FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT DEVELOP-
MENTS 93 (July 24–26, 2008), Westlaw SP003 ALI-ABA 845, 930 (“[T]he vast 
majority of courts which have addressed individual liability under the FMLA 
have held that private sector employees with supervisory authority can be 
held liable in their individual capacities for FMLA violations.”). 
 147. Then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg once stated the following with re-
gard to Congress’srole in resolving circuit splits: “There is, of course, an ideal 
intercircuit conflict resolver . . . Congress itself. On the correct interpretation 
of federal statutes, no assemblage is better equipped to say which circuit got it 
right.” Intercircuit Panel of the United States Act: Hearing on S. 704 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 115 (1985) 
(statement of Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg). 
 148. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 149. See, e.g., Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 
408, 417 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he FMLA’s similarity to the FLSA indicates that 
Congress intended for courts to treat the FMLA the same as the FLSA, rather 
than treating only specific provisions alike . . . .” (citing Modica v. Taylor, 465 
F.3d 174, 186 (5th Cir. 2006))). 
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individually liable for any violations of the requirements of 
FMLA.”150 The Department of Labor presumably emphasized 
this definitional similarity because it viewed the similarity as 
evidence of Congress’s intent that the FMLA, like the FLSA, 
impose individual liability.151 In contrast to judicial and agency 
action, Congress can definitively resolve the circuit split by 
simply stating its intent. 
In addition to being best situated to provide a definitive 
resolution to the circuit split, Congress is also in the best posi-
tion to resolve the split quickly. Congress could settle the cir-
cuit split faster than the Supreme Court, especially since it is 
probable that the Supreme Court will never step in to settle the 
split.152 Additionally, an amendment precluding individual lia-
bility could likely garner the bipartisan support necessary to 
achieve swift passage through Congress; unlike family leave 
itself,153 FMLA individual liability is not a politicized issue on 
which each of the major political parties has taken a stance. 
Consequently, Congress is best situated to resolve the circuit 
split finally and swiftly. 
3. Addressing Counterarguments: Why Congressional Action 
Is Necessary and Would Not Be Unprecedented 
Although this Note advocates for congressional resolution 
of the current circuit split, there exist counterarguments that 
press for a hands-off approach or question the propriety of con-
gressional intervention following years of apparent acquies-
cence. One counterargument to congressional resolution is that 
 
 150. 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(d) (2015). 
 151. See Haybarger, 667 F.3d at 414 (noting that the Department of Labor 
responded to concerns about the imposition of FMLA individual liability by 
stating that Congress chose to define “employer” similarly under the FMLA 
and FLSA, and individual liability may be imposed under the FLSA). 
 152. See Deborah Beim & Kelly Rader, Evolution of Conflict in the Courts 
of Appeals 26 (May 12, 2015) (preliminary draft prepared for the 2015 Mid-
west Political Science Association Annual Meeting), http://campuspress.yale 
.edu/beim/files/2011/10/Beim_Rader_Conflicts-xxkfk0.pdf (“We find that very 
few conflicts in the Courts of Appeals are resolved [by the Supreme Court]—
only 5% of the conflicts we identified as being born in 2005 have been resolved 
as of yet. Those that are resolved are resolved soon after they begin . . . . [T]he 
median number of years between birth and resolution is 1.”). 
 153. See Donna R. Lenhoff & Lissa Bell, NAT’L PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN 
& FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR WORKING FAMILIES AND FOR COM-
MUNITIES: FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE AS A CASE STUDY 1 (2016), http://www 
.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/work-family/fmla/fmla-case-study 
-lenhoff-bell.pdf (noting that it took a nine-year effort from 1984 until 1993 for 
the FMLA to become law). 
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the public sector individual liability issue is not a pressing one 
and the courts can resolve it without intervention by the Su-
preme Court or Congress. However, the number of federal 
FMLA lawsuits has rapidly increased154 and the current judicial 
regime involving several malleable “control tests” is ill-
equipped to tackle this onslaught of litigation. Employers and 
supervisors will continue to grapple with FMLA liability expo-
sure under a regime of “control tests,” since each “control test” 
emphasizes different elements of the employment relationship 
and invites judicial manipulation. 
An additional counterargument revolves around the notion 
of congressional acquiescence: Congress has said nothing about 
the individual liability issue for over twenty years, so why 
would it intervene now? While Congress has admittedly re-
mained silent on the issue in the years since the FMLA was 
enacted, amending the FMLA and overriding the judicial “con-
trol tests” that have developed over time would not necessarily 
be out of character for Congress.155 In short, a congressional 
amendment imposing respondeat superior liability would pro-
vide an appropriately swift, administrable solution to the ur-
gent problem presented by the current circuit split. 
B. A STEP TOWARD CLARITY: CONGRESSIONAL AMENDMENT TO 
THE FMLA TO PRECLUDE INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY 
Given that Congress is best situated to resolve the current 
split, this Note proposes that Congress amend the FMLA to 
preclude individual liability for supervisors, both public and 
private, and instead impose respondeat superior liability. While 
multiple scholars have suggested that Congress may have in-
tended to incorporate respondeat superior principles in the 
FMLA’s definition of “employer,”156 no piece of legal scholarship 
 
 154. See Terri Gillespie, Tips To Help Stem the Rising Tide of FMLA 
Claims, HR LEGALIST (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.hrlegalist.com/2015/01/tips-to 
-help-stem-the-rising-tide-of-fmla-claims (“In 2012, there were 406 new federal 
FMLA cases filed nationally. In 2013, that number more than doubled to 992; 
and, in 2014, there were 1115 FMLA lawsuits filed in federal courts through-
out the country.”). 
 155. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Brief 
Introductory Analysis of the Congressional Response to Judicial Interpretation, 
68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 923, 928 (1993) (noting that, in enacting the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Congress “reversed various Supreme Court decisions deal-
ing with employment discrimination”). 
 156. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 120, at 1313; Sperino, supra note 12, at 
87. 
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has suggested that Congress amend the FMLA to impose 
respondeat superior liability. The amendment this Note pro-
poses would alter the language in 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(ii)(I)157 
to read as follows: “any agent of such person.” This language 
would indicate Congress’s intent to incorporate respondeat su-
perior liability for FMLA interference or retaliation violations 
involving supervisors.158 Inclusion of “any agent of” language in 
an amendment to the FMLA’s definition of “employer” would 
also bring the FMLA’s liability scheme in line with those of an-
tidiscrimination statutes like the ADA and the ADEA that 
serve similar purposes.159 Additionally, to remove any statutory 
ambiguity as to whether Congress intended for private employ-
ers and public agencies to be treated differently, Congress 
should amend 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(iii) and § 2611(4)(a)(iv) by 
eliminating the word “includes” from these sections and re-
 
 157. The text of 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A) defines “employer” for FMLA pur-
poses and currently reads as follows: 
(A) In general 
The term “employer”— 
(i) means any person engaged in commerce or in any industry or 
activity affecting commerce who employs 50 or more employees 
for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar work-
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year; 
(ii) includes— 
(I) any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest 
of an employer to any of the employees of such employer; and 
(II) any successor in interest of an employer; 
(iii) includes any “public agency”, as defined in section 203(x) of 
this title; and 
(iv) includes the Government Accountability Office and the Li-
brary of Congress. 
29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A) (2012). 
 158. Such “any agent of” language has been construed as imposing 
respondeat superior liability under employment antidiscrimination statutes 
such as the ADA, ADEA, and Title VII. See, e.g., U.S. E.E.O.C. v. AIC Sec. 
Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1281 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he actual reason 
for the ‘and any agent’ language in the [ADEA’s] definition of ‘employer’ was to 
ensure that courts would impose respondeat superior liability upon employers 
for the acts of their agents.”). 
 159. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (“It is the purpose of this Act . . . to ac-
complish the purposes [of the FMLA] in a manner that, consistent with the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, minimizes the poten-
tial for employment discrimination on the basis of sex . . . .”), with 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12101(b) (2012) (“It is the purpose of this chapter . . . to invoke the sweep of 
congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth 
amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of 
discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.”), and 29 U.S.C. 
§ 621(b) (“It is therefore the purpose of this chapter . . . to prohibit arbitrary 
age discrimination in employment.”). 
  
414 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:383 
 
designating them § 2611(4)(a)(III) and § 2611(4)(a)(IV), respec-
tively. 
Amending the text of the FMLA in this way would settle 
the individual liability question with finality, and is appropri-
ate in scope because there are no relevant differences between 
public and private supervisors for FMLA liability purposes.160 
Although the private and public sectors do differ with respect to 
employment aspects such as budgetary constraints and empha-
sis on bureaucracy,161 supervisors in both the public and private 
sector context generally exercise control over “employer-related 
decisionmaking” such as fielding FMLA requests.162 Thus, any 
amendment to the FMLA regarding individual liability should 
affect private and public employees equally. 
Parts III.B.1 and III.B.2 discuss two of the benefits of a 
congressional amendment that would preclude individual lia-
bility and impose respondeat superior liability: preempting the 
creation of more judicial “control tests” and effectuating the pol-
icy goals underlying the FMLA. Part III.B.3 addresses several 
counterarguments to the solution that this Note proposes. 
1. Preempting the Creation of More “Control Tests” 
As discussed in Part II.B.1, the Second and Third Circuits’ 
application of an “economic realities” test in conjunction with 
broad “totality of the circumstances” language foreshadows the 
emergence of even more judicial “control tests” for imposing 
individual FMLA liability. An amendment imposing respondeat 
superior liability would bring with it a more confined and defi-
 
 160. See Brainerd, supra note 21, at 1587–88 (“[T]here is no fundamental 
difference between public and private sector supervisors and, as a result, their 
liability exposure should remain equal.”); Kegan A. Brown, supra note 12, at 
1056. But see Shaili Pezeshki, Comment, The FMLA and Its Shortcoming: Can 
Your Supervisor Wrongfully Terminate Just Because You Work in a Public 
Agency?, 40 SW. L. REV. 551, 568 (2011) (arguing that there are “inherent in-
stitutional differences” between public and private employment and that, 
while individual liability should be imposed on both public and private super-
visors, there should be a higher threshold for the imposition of such liability 
on public sector supervisors). 
 161. See Management Challenges: Government vs. Private Sector, 
GOVLEADERS.ORG, http://govleaders.org/matrix.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2016) 
(comparing the challenges faced by public and private sector supervisors with 
respect to budgetary constraints, hiring, firing, bureaucracy, and procure-
ment). 
 162. See Brainerd, supra note 21, at 1606 (“Though public sector supervi-
sors may not have direct control over actual salaries, they are still likely to 
have significant control over bonuses, availability of overtime, promotions and 
other such employer-related decision-making.”). 
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nite judicial test: an employer would be subject to liability for 
FMLA violations committed by its employees “while acting 
within the scope of their employment.”163 
Although it would promote consistency, the “within the 
scope of employment” judicial test would present a trade-off to 
employers. It is likely that nearly every FMLA lawsuit alleging 
interference with or retaliation for exercising FMLA rights 
would subject an employer to respondeat superior liability, 
since granting or denying FMLA leave or retaliating against an 
employee for exercising FMLA rights will arguably always be 
“within the scope of a supervisor’s employment.”164 On the other 
hand, this level of predictability would enable employers to bet-
ter estimate the legal liability they face and structure their 
businesses accordingly.165 For the reasons discussed in Part 
III.B.2, this trade-off ultimately supports the achievement of 
the FMLA’s goals and promotes good policy. 
2. Effectuating the FMLA’s Goals and Promoting Sound Policy 
A congressional amendment precluding individual liability 
for supervisors under the FMLA and imposing respondeat su-
perior liability would support the achievement of the remedial 
goals Congress delineated when it enacted the FMLA.166 First, 
imposing respondeat superior liability would align the FMLA’s 
liability scheme with those of other federal antidiscrimination 
statutes and express a commitment to compensating employ-
ees’ whose FMLA rights have been violated.167 Second, an em-
ployer-entity, not its supervisors, is in the best position to pro-
 
 163. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). The 
American Law Institute states that “[a]n employee acts within the scope of 
employment when performing work assigned by the employer or engaging in a 
course of conduct subject to the employer’s control.” Id. § 7.07(2). 
 164. See Rogers, supra note 120, at 1313. 
 165. Cf. Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1598 
(2008) (“[I]nconsistent interpretation of federal law could be more disruptive 
than variations in state laws [for multi-state actors].”); COMM’N ON REVISION 
OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, 67 F.R.D. 195, 206–07 (1975) (“[D]ifferences 
in legal rules applied by the circuits result in unequal treatment of citizens . . . 
solely because of differences in geography . . . .”). 
 166. See supra Part I.A.1 (delineating Congress’spurposes in enacting the 
FMLA). 
 167. See supra notes 158–59 and accompanying text. As discussed in Part 
II.A.2, there are relevant differences between the FLSA and FMLA such that 
altering the FMLA’s liability scheme to align with those of antidiscrimination 
statutes, instead of the FLSA, is intuitive. 
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vide the FMLA’s remedies to an aggrieved plaintiff-employee in 
the event of a statutory violation.168 Third, under the proposed 
amendment’s definitions, there would be no question as to 
whether low-level supervisors are “employees” capable of as-
serting their FMLA rights.169 Finally, imposing respondeat su-
perior liability for FMLA violations would incentivize employ-
ers to provide effective FMLA compliance training and protect 
employees’ FMLA rights so as to limit legal liability.170 In short, 
amending the FMLA to impose respondeat superior liability 
would accomplish the goals Congress set forth at the time of 
the FMLA’s enactment more effectively than an individual lia-
bility scheme. 
3. Addressing Counterarguments: Why the Proposed 
Congressional Amendment Is Necessary 
Although this Note posits that a congressional amendment 
imposing respondeat superior liability will lead to more effi-
cient and complete achievement of the FMLA’s goals, court cas-
es and scholarly literature raise several counterarguments to 
this assertion. Parts III.B.3.a and III.B.3.b address statutory 
interpretation and practical counterarguments to the proposal 
that Congress amend the FMLA to preclude individual liability 
and impose respondeat superior liability. 
 
 168. See Rogers, supra note 120, at 1340. Scholars have made similar ar-
guments for imposing respondeat superior liability in order to fully compen-
sate plaintiffs for violations of Title VII. See Rebecca Hanner White, Vicarious 
and Personal Liability for Employment Discrimination, 30 GA. L. REV. 509, 
543 (1996) (“It is the employer who is best positioned to remedy discrimination 
when it occurs. An award of backpay and compensatory and punitive damages 
against a supervisor often may be uncollectible, as most individuals do not 
have the assets to satisfy such awards.” (footnote omitted)). 
 169. As Sperino notes, labeling a low-level supervisor an “employer” for 
purposes of individual liability could prevent these individuals from being 
considered “employees” who may take advantage of the FMLA’s protections. 
See Sperino, supra note 37, at 225–26. 
 170. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 
2006) (“Respondeat superior creates an incentive for principals to choose em-
ployees and structure work within the organization so as to reduce the inci-
dence of tortious conduct. This incentive may reduce the incidence of tortious 
conduct more effectively than doctrines that impose liability solely on an indi-
vidual tortfeasor.”). Hanner White made a similar argument with respect to 
respondeat superior liability under Title VII. See Hanner White, supra note 
168, at 544 (“An employer on the line for damages occasioned by its agents’ 
discrimination not only has a powerful incentive to ensure those agents com-
ply with the law but also has the means to do so.”). 
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a. Counterargument to Proposed Solution: The Similarity 
Between the FMLA and FLSA Definitions of “Employer” 
Demonstrate Congress’s Intent That the Two Be Construed 
Similarly 
The primary argument advanced by courts holding in favor 
of imposing individual liability in both the private and public 
sectors focuses on the similarity between the FMLA and FLSA 
definitions of “employer.”171 While such an argument is a ra-
tional one, it is refuted by the legislative history of the FMLA, 
which must be considered after one acknowledges that the 
FMLA’s definition of “employer” is ambiguous.172 As discussed 
previously, the FMLA’s legislative history includes no specific 
discussion of individual liability. 173  But perhaps more im-
portantly, when Congress intended to achieve objectives under 
the FMLA similar to those it sought to achieve under the 
FLSA, and when Congress intended courts to interpret FMLA 
provisions in the same way as similar portions of the FLSA, 
Congress explicitly said so. 174  In fact, with respect to the 
FMLA’s definitions, Congress stated that “[t]hose definitions 
specifically referenced to the Fair Labor Standards Act are to 
be interpreted similarly under [the FMLA].”175 Later in the 
FMLA’s legislative history, Congress defines “employer” and 
references the FLSA only to state its intention that “public 
agency” have the same definition under the FMLA as it does 
under the FLSA.176 Thus, the assertion underlying the bulk of 
court opinions holding in favor of individual liability is, at best, 
an interpretation of the FMLA’s definition of “employer” made 
in the absence of on-point legislative history and, at worst, an 
 
 171. See supra Parts I.B.1, I.C.1. 
 172. See Sperino, supra note 12, at 72 (“The lower courts’ failure to reach a 
consensus as to when imposition of individual liability is appropriate, instead 
creating eight different tests for individual liability, suggests that the meaning 
of the term ‘employer’ may not be so plain.”). 
 173. See supra note 12 and accompanying text; see also Rogers, supra note 
120, at 1310 (“[T]here is virtually no mention made in the legislative history of 
the FMLA regarding the precise issue of individual versus business entity 
liability.”). 
 174. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 103-3, at 35 (1993) (“This provision is modeled on 
section 15(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) and is similar-
ly intended to achieve the objective of protecting employees who file charges or 
otherwise participate in proceedings under this title . . . .”); id. at 36 (“[T]his 
provision is modeled after section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, and 
therefore should be interpreted in the same way as the FLSA.”). 
 175. Id. at 43. 
 176. Id. 
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interpretation in direct conflict with the FMLA legislative his-
tory that Congress did produce. 
b. Counterargument to Proposed Solution: Unpredictability 
Resulting from FMLA “Control Tests” Promotes Compliance by 
Compelling Supervisors To Be Cautious in Denying Leave 
Another counterargument to this Note’s proposed solution 
is the assertion that unpredictability stemming from the incon-
sistent judicial application of variable FMLA “control tests” in-
centivizes supervisors to be overly cautious and avoid commit-
ting FMLA violations. While it is true that attorneys are pres-
suring their client-employers to counsel their supervisors to be 
cautious in handling FMLA leave requests lest they be held 
individually liable,177 it is doubtful whether overly cautious su-
pervisors (and overly permissive leave policies) make for a su-
perior work environment. It is often the case that when an em-
ployee takes FMLA leave, employers reassign the absent em-
ployee’s work to his or her co-employees.178 Should supervisors 
become overly lenient in granting leave in order to avoid incur-
ring individual liability under the FMLA, it is possible that 
more employees will take advantage of FMLA leave without 
justification and provoke the resentment of their co-employees 
who are forced to pick up the slack.179 So although unpredicta-
 
 177. See, e.g., Robert F. Manfredo, Human Resource Professionals Beware – 
Second Circuit Finds HR Director May Be Individually Liable Under the 
FMLA, N.Y. LAB. & EMP. L. REP. (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.nylaborand 
employmentlawreport.com/2016/03/articles/family-and-medical-leave-act/ 
human-resource-professionals-beware-second-circuit-finds-hr-director-may-be 
-individually-liable-under-the-fmla (“[Graziadio] stands as a stark reminder to 
human resource professionals involved in making decisions related to employ-
ee FMLA requests to proceed with caution and to strictly comply with the re-
quirements of the FMLA when processing requests for leave.”). 
 178. See SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., FMLA AND ITS IMPACT ON ORGAN-
IZATIONS: A SURVEY REPORT BY THE SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MAN-
AGEMENT 7 (2007) (“During an employee’s FMLA leave, nearly nine out of 10 
organizations attended to the employee’s workload by assigning work tempo-
rarily to other employees.”). 
 179. See HR Matters: How Absenteeism Impacts Your Co-Workers, HUM. 
RESOURCES INC., http://www.hri-online.com/blog/how-absenteeism-impacts 
-your-co-workers (last visited Oct. 15, 2016) (describing how continued absen-
teeism can cause resentment in employees who must cover for those who are 
absent); Employee Turnover and Retention, WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY 2010 
(2007), http://workplaceflexibility2010.org/images/uploads/EE%20turnover%20 
FMLA.pdf (noting that, in response to a Department of Labor request for in-
formation regarding the FMLA’s impact on employee morale, productivity, 
turnover, and retention, employers “mention[ed] the resentment amongst co-
workers forced to cover the shifts of employees on leave”). 
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ble judicial “control tests” may cause supervisors to be more 
lenient in granting FMLA leave, the detriment to work envi-
ronments that is likely to result therefrom threatens to out-
weigh the benefit resulting from the possibility of fewer FMLA 
violations. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the mid-1990s, the FMLA has been read to encom-
pass individual liability for private sector supervisors. But the 
development of this majority rule has brought with it an on-
slaught of malleable judicial “control tests” and uncritical ac-
ceptance of the notion that Congress intended the FMLA’s lia-
bility scheme to parallel that of the FLSA. Such reasoning per-
sists in the current circuit split regarding the individual FMLA 
liability question as it applies to the public sector. 
This Note proposes a solution that would resolve the cur-
rent circuit split regarding individual liability for public sector 
supervisors. Amending the FMLA to incorporate respondeat 
superior liability would put a halt to the creation of malleable 
judicial “control tests,” resulting in greater predictability for 
both supervisors and employers seeking to advise their super-
visors in order to avoid committing FMLA violations. Addition-
ally, the imposition of respondeat superior liability would bet-
ter promote the effectuation of the goals that Congress original-
ly set out to achieve when it enacted the FMLA, since employ-
ers are best situated to both prevent FMLA violations from oc-
curring and compensate aggrieved plaintiff-employees when 
violations do occur. In sum, a congressional amendment to pre-
clude individual liability and instead impose respondeat supe-
rior liability would pave the way for the improvement of FMLA 
compliance in both public and private sector work environ-
ments. 
